Description: "Whoever said 'the pen is mightier than the sword' obviously never encountered automatic weapons."
I have a piece out in War on the Rocks , on the limitations of “enhancing” the U.S. forward presence in the Western Pacific. In short: putting additional forces at our existing (and vulnerable) bases doesn’t add any value; there’s no appetite among allies to provide new bases or access arrangements, especially if we’d want to deploy land-based missile systems; and focusing on putting military forces forward is probably the wrong way to approach the issue in the first place.
For all the posturing over the absolute necessity of deploying missile and forces forwards now, just because the United States wishes it does not mean it will happen. New basing options cannot simply be willed into existence.
Insofar as it’s only been a day, I think it has been well-received. Mike Mazarr , in particular, wrote a very nice thread about the need to reconsider our assumptions of access and how those affect force structure and acquisition planning themselves:
Chicago Boyz – Some Chicago Boyz know each other from student days at the University of Chicago. Others are Chicago boys in spir
Airminded
oldephartte(in training)
Chicago Boyz – Some Chicago Boyz know each other from student days at the University of Chicago. Others are Chicago boys in spir